Disaster Mitigation and Preparedness: Comparisons of Nonprofit, Public, and Private Organizations by Chikoto, Grace L. et al.
Disaster Mitigation and Preparedness: Comparisons of Nonprofit, 
Public, and Private Organizations 
Grace L. Chikoto, Abdul-Akeem Sadiq and Erin Fordyce 
2013 
 
 
Abstract 
Few studies have compared the mitigation and preparedness activities 
adopted by nonprofit, private, and public organizations. This study 
contributes to this important literature by comparing the adoption of 
mitigation and preparedness activities by nonprofit, private, and public 
organizations in Memphis, Tennessee. The findings show that although 
nonprofit organizations may be more resource-constrained compared 
with private corporations, they adopt more mitigation and preparedness 
activities than private corporations. In addition, public organizations 
adopt more mitigation and preparedness activities than private 
organizations. The results are inconclusive on the comparison between 
nonprofits and public agencies. 
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Introduction 
Disasters usually leave behind a trail marked by death, destruction to 
property and the natural environment, and disruption to businesses and 
everyday living. For instance, between 1990 and 1999, an estimated 
188 million people were affected by natural disasters annually (Purvis 
& Busby, 2004). Notable disasters in recent history include the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, which resulted in 2,973 fatalities (9/11 
Commission Report, 2004) and Hurricane Katrina, which killed more 
than 2,000 people (GAO, 2008) and caused more than US$200 billion in 
economic losses (Burby, 2006). Regarding structural damage alone, a 
2006 Federal Emergency Management Authority (FEMA) study reported 
the annual estimated losses to the national building stock at US$5.3 
billion (FEMA, 2007). 
Evidence from the disaster literature (e.g., Mileti, 1999) and the 
insurance community (e.g., Munich Reinsurance Group, 2009) 
suggests continuing increases in disaster losses. For Instance, in 2008, 
the United States suffered 342 fatalities and about US$ 67.2 billion in 
estimated total losses to natural disasters (Munich Reinsurance Group, 
2009). Due to the potential future increases in disaster losses, public, 
private, and nonprofit organizations are under pressure to incorporate 
disaster mitigation and preparedness measures in an attempt to help 
organizations reduce their losses from disasters (Dahlhammer & 
D’Souza, 1997). The degree to which they have adopted such measures, 
however, remains in question, especially with regard to the nonprofit 
sector. 
As important social service providers, nonprofit organizations are not 
only a critical link to the nation’s welfare state, (Salamon, 1995; 2003; 
Smith & Lipsky, 1993), they also play key roles in the nation’s disaster 
preparedness and response efforts (Vita & Morley, 2007), especially in 
view of the public sectors’ evolving role and often sluggish involvement 
in disaster response (Kapucu & Wart, 2006). For example, although the 
response to Hurricane Katrina was hampered by limitations in 
“resources, equity, accountability, and coordination,” Gajewski, Bell, 
Lein and Angel (2011) characterized the response by nonprofit and 
faith-based organizations as “highly motivated, flexible, and creative” 
(p. 289). To others, the effects of hurricanes Katrina and Rita further 
demonstrated the importance of nonprofit organizations to 
communities as they rose to the challenge of not only responding to 
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flood victims but also providing food and shelter to hurricane victims 
(Auer & Lampkin, 2006; Vita & Morley, 2007). In light of these 
supplementary and complementary roles nonprofits play in society 
(Young, 2006a), as well as the unique challenges they encounter in 
raising funds to finance their programs, compared with public and 
private organizations (Young, 2006b); it is important to assess the 
extent to which they are prepared for disasters. Using a unique data set, 
we examine the question; Do nonprofit organizations engage in more 
mitigation and preparedness activities than private and public 
organizations? To answer this question, we compare nonprofits’ disaster 
mitigation and preparedness strategies with those of public and private 
organizations. 
In the aftermath of hurricanes Katrina and Rita, research has primarily 
focused on the roles nonprofit organizations played in Hurricane 
Katrina relief efforts (Pipa, 2006), with an emphasis on the new roles 
they play as the nature of their services changed in response to 
emergent needs (Auer & Lampkin, 2006; NCCS, 2005; Vita & Morley, 
2007). Additional attention has also been paid to their roles in cross-
sector collaborations (Kapucu, 2007; Simo & Bies, 2007; Sylves, 2008-
9; Waugh & Streib, 2006), and the nature of volunteering in disaster 
relief (Rotolo & Berg, 2010). With some exceptions (e.g., Fowler, Kling 
& Larson, 2007; Gajewski, Bell, Lein & Angel, 2011; Meyer-Emerick & 
Momen, 2003), very few attempts have been made to assess the extent 
to which nonprofits adopt disaster mitigation and preparedness 
measures. This article seeks to make contribution to this literature. 
 
Organizations and Disasters 
 
Organizations face considerable threats from disasters which often 
result in significant organizational disruptions (Lindell & Perry, 2007), 
including jeopardizing their ability to provide goods and services, and 
losses in sales, property taxes (Tierney, 1994), and services. This 
consequently undermines the economy and the support systems of 
communities (Lindell & Perry, 2007). For example, the 1994 
Northridge earthquake, caused substantial structural damage to 
businesses in Los Angeles (Tierney, 1997), including the collapse of a 
2,500-car parking garage and almost destroying every building at 
California State University. Although, organizations cannot control the 
physical characteristics of disasters such as magnitude and frequency 
(Nigg, 1996); they can, however, reduce disaster impacts by adopting 
mitigation and preparedness measures (Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997). 
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Given the devastating effects disasters can have on all facets of a 
community, nonprofits have also fallen victim. For instance, Hurricane 
Katrina caused extensive damage to colleges and universities in the Gulf 
Coast area, resulting in temporary closures at Tulane University, Dillard 
University, and Loyola University, New Orleans. Between 2005 and 
2006, Tulane University is reported to have suffered a 10% drop in its 
total revenues, whereas Xavier University and Loyola University New 
Orleans lost more than 12% and 26% in revenues, respectively 
(Weisbrod & Asch, 2010). 
To further demonstrate the impact of disasters on organizations, 95% 
of the 212 health and human service nonprofits that responded to a 
Louisiana Association of Nonprofit Organizations (LANO) survey 
reported being directly or indirectly impacted by Hurricane Katrina. Auer 
and Lampkin (2006) suspected 98 of them to have temporarily or 
permanently closed. And according to a Mississippi Center for 
Nonprofits survey, 67% of nonprofit organizations in the Biloxi-
Pascagoula metro area suffered losses of paid staff members or 
volunteer staff, with 77% reporting major building damage or loss, and 
another 93% reporting losses of programs or services (Pipa, 2006). 
Overall, Hurricane Katrina devastated an already struggling 
infrastructure, one that not only delivered essential health and human 
services to residents in New Orleans, but also provided major 
educational, cultural, and other societal benefits (NCCS, 2005). Before 
Hurricane Katrina, there were 3,200 nonprofits in Louisiana, of which 
900 were located in New Orleans. Of the 900, 83 provided health and 
mental health services, while 385 charities provided human services and 
community improvement programs to New Orleans residents (NCCS, 
2005). One key role involves how nonprofits helped communities to 
respond to and recover from disasters. As demonstrated by their 
responses to hurricanes Katrina and Rita, in the case of Louisiana and 
Mississippi, local nonprofits and religious congregations played crucial 
roles in responding to victims of the hurricanes (Pipa, 2006). And of the 
250,000 Gulf Coast evacuees that sought shelter in Texas, nonprofit 
organizations proved to be key players in responding to their needs for 
shelter, food, and other necessities (Gajewski, et al., 2011). 
Clearly, nonprofits have become a key fixture in American society. 
Theory suggests that when local, state, and federal governments are 
overburdened or fall short (Steinberg, 2006; Weisbrod, 1977), 
nonprofits step in to fill the void by providing much needed goods 
and services (Salamon, 1995; Steinberg, 2006; Young, 2006a). And as 
“a major economic force” (Salamon, Anheier, List, Toepler, & 
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Sokolowski, 1999, p. 8), the importance of the U. S. nonprofit sector is 
also evident in its contribution to the economy. According to the 
National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS), the sector accounts 
for a significant share of employment (7% in 2009); representing 9% 
of the economy’s wages and salaries (NCCS, 2012). The sector also 
contributed US$779 billion in expenditures—an estimated 5.4% of the 
nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2010 (Urban Institute, 2012). 
As of November 2011, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reported a 
total of 1.58 million registered nonprofits (including private 
foundations). Of these, the 1.16 million nonprofits filing 990 forms with 
the IRS generated a total of US$1.94 trillion in revenue and US$6.36 
trillion in total assets (NCCS, 2012). The growth rate was 25% between 
2001 and 2011, surpassing that of the public and private sectors (Urban 
Institute, 2012). 
In spite of encountering difficulties in mobilizing sufficient 
resources to sustain their operations (Young, 2006b), compared with 
government and private organizations, the social and political roles 
nonprofits play in the United States remain critical, some of which 
include; service provision, advocacy, community building, and 
democratization (Salamon, Hems, & Chinnock, 2000). As a result, the 
question of whether nonprofit organizations adopt disaster preparedness 
and mitigation measures becomes critical. 
 
Mitigating and Preparing for Disasters: Does Organizational Form 
Matter? 
A number of notable studies focusing on mitigation and preparedness 
at the organizational level have appeared over the years (e.g., Dahlhamer 
& D’Souza, 1997; Fowler et al., 2007; Light, 2008; Sadiq, 2010; 
Sadiq & Weible, 2010; Webb, Tierney, & Dahlhamer, 2000). Despite 
these efforts and the fact that there are no explicit theories to guide 
research on the determinants of mitigation and preparedness at the 
organizational level of analysis (Sadiq, 2010), this line of research 
could benefit from additional studies, in particular, studies centered on 
disaster mitigation and preparedness in nonprofit organizations. 
At the individual level of analysis, the state of research on mitigation 
and preparedness is more advanced. The myriad studies focusing on the 
determinants of mitigation and preparedness measures at the individual 
level provide insightful theoretical direction. Derived from a long list of 
disaster studies spanning 25 years, the protective action decision model 
(PADM) in particular, provides a framework for understanding the 
determinants of mitigation and preparedness at the household level 
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(Lindell & Perry, 2004; 2011). Within the context of the PADM, variables 
such as risk perception, disaster experience, and resource availability 
have been found to have a significant relationship with household 
adoption of hazard adjustments. Drawing from this model, our analysis 
compares the number of mitigation and preparedness measures (hazard 
adjustments) adopted by nonprofit organizations with those adopted by 
private corporations and public agencies. Hazard adjustments refer to “. . . 
actions that intentionally or unintentionally reduce risk from extreme 
events in the natural environment” (Lindell & Perry, 2000, p. 461-462). 
The PADM is useful in that it predicts an expected positive 
correlation between resource availability and actual hazard adjustments 
among individuals or households (Lindell & Perry, 2000). Investigating 
whether nonprofits undertook continuity planning, a process concerned 
with “the maintenance of critical operational processes” in the face of 
“natural, anthropogenic, or technological interruptions” (p. 1), 
MeyerEmerick and Momen (2003) also found a positive correlation 
between resources and continuity planning adoption. The authors found 
the lack of fiscal or staff resources among nonprofits to be a key 
impediment in their ability to undertake continuity planning activities 
such as backing up data offsite and installing fireproof safes for sensitive 
and important documents or planning for short or long-term interruptions 
due to power outages or complete losses in facilities. 
Based on the PADM’s prediction and Meyer-Emerick and Momen’s 
(2003) findings, we expect organizations with more resources to adopt a 
higher number of mitigation and preparedness measures than those with 
fewer resources. Extrapolating this relationship to the organizational 
level also provides an opportunity to implicitly test the PADM by 
investigating whether nonprofits—as organizations that “often struggle 
to mobilize sufficient resources” (Young, 2006b, p. xxi)—adopt fewer 
disaster mitigation and preparedness activities compared with private 
and public organizations. Relative to public and private organizations, 
nonprofits not only face financial resource limitations (Gajewski, et al., 
2011), but also may face donor-imposed restrictions on how they can 
allocate those resources. Other researchers have also established the 
importance of financial and technical resources in the adoption of 
disaster mitigation activities (Sadiq, 2010), as well as the time and effort 
it takes to adopt risk-reducing measures (Wyner & Mann, 1986). 
Unlike private corporations that depend on the sale of their goods and 
services for generating revenue and public agencies that depend on tax 
revenue, nonprofits have a unique access to charitable contributions from 
individuals and institutional donors, as well as various socially-focused 
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entrepreneurial strategies (Weisbrod, 1998; Young, 2006b). However, 
this unique access comes with its unique challenges (e.g., difficulties in 
raising funds and the restrictions that may be attached to funding), which 
could negatively influence nonprofits’ investments in disaster 
preparedness and mitigation measures. 
The position of nonprofits is further confounded by the increased 
expectation that the organizations dedicate the majority of their funding 
toward funding innovative and effective solutions to address various 
societal ills that the fragile welfare state no longer directly provides. For 
instance, Sloan (2009) found that fundraising and programming 
efficiency ratings from watchdog organizations like the Wise Giving 
Alliance significantly influenced the contributions nonprofit 
organizations received. This implies that, as long as nonprofits are 
expected to spend larger proportions of their funding on programming, 
we would not expect them to have sufficient funds set aside for investing 
in disaster mitigation and preparedness practices, unless they are larger 
and more financially stable (Lindenberg & Bryant, 2001) or they 
possess significant amounts of unrestricted income. 
With regard to the level of disaster mitigation and preparedness 
among the three sectors, research suggests that organizational disaster 
mitigation and preparedness remains relatively low across all three 
sectors. A 2002 global survey of corporate preparedness indicated that, 
whereas 93% of 140 corporate strategists reported their organizations as 
being surprised by as many as 3 high-impact events that had occurred in 
the previous 5 years, 97% reported that their companies did not have 
early warning systems in place (Fuld, 2003). According to a 2007 
survey of the top 50% of executives whose organizations had 
experienced a crisis such as hurricane, the collapse of infrastructures or 
armed conflicts, only 25% expected such major occurrences in the next 
3 years (Nabel, 2007). 
In a study of perceived organizational disaster preparedness by Fowler 
et al. (2007) government organizations expressed the highest levels of 
perceived disaster preparedness relative to private corporations, which 
exhibited the lowest perceptions. This finding was contrary to their 
hypothesis that private companies would have the highest perception of 
disaster preparedness. Compared with nonprofit organizations, 
government agencies also expressed higher perceptions of disaster 
preparedness (mean difference of 3.57). And although nonprofits 
exhibited slightly higher perceptions of disaster preparedness compared 
with private businesses (a mean difference of .49), this was not 
statistically significant. 
7  
Other researchers have attempted to identify the core predictors of 
organizational crisis readiness—a broader concept that encompasses one’s 
ability to respond to and recover from both external (e.g., natural 
disasters) and internal (e.g., financial crises) events (Light, 2008). For 
example, a descriptive study based on a 2006 random survey of 4,000 
opinion leaders in state and local governments, businesses, and nonprofit 
organizations (N = 468) conducted by Princeton Survey Research 
Associates found characteristics such as, external relationships, leadership, 
and the nature of internal structures to positively influence perceived 
crisis readiness (Light, 2008). Data limitations prevented Light (2008) 
from investigating sector differences. Similar to Fowler et al. (2007); 
however, Light (2008) found that government organizations (51%) were 
perceived to be more crisis-ready compared with nonprofit (29%) and 
businesses organizations (20%). 
Based on the above surveys, it appears that, in spite of the relative 
differences in financial resources, nonprofits show higher disaster 
readiness perceptions than for profit businesses. However, government 
ranks top in perceived disaster preparedness. These surveys and the 
PADM, therefore, provide the basis for our hypotheses; although only our 
first hypothesis is tangentially supported by the PADM.1 
 
Hypothesis 1: Nonprofit organizations adopt fewer mitigation and 
preparedness activities than public organizations. 
Hypothesis 2: Nonprofit organizations adopt more mitigation and 
preparedness activities than private organizations. 
 
Although, to our knowledge, no theoretical basis predicts adoption 
differences among private, nonprofit, and public organizations, it is 
reasonable to expect differences in missions, social functions, roles, and 
resource dispositions to influence the number of mitigation and 
preparedness measures they adopt. 
 
Methods 
 
The Study Setting 
 
Memphis is the largest city in Tennessee with a population of about 
650,000. Earthquakes are a major disaster risk in the Memphis area due 
to the hazard posed by the New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ). 
According to the U. S. Geological Survey (USGS) (2008a), the three 
most powerful earthquakes in the United States (magnitude 7.0-8.1) 
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occurred in the NMSZ between December 16, 1811 and February 7, 
1812 (Memphis and Shelby county were not settlements then). 
Although many dispute the characterization of the risk, USGS (1998) 
estimated a more than 90% probability of a moderate earthquake 
(magnitude 6.7) hitting the NMSZ within the next 50 years. In 
comparison, the odds of a magnitude 6.7 or larger earthquake in the next 
30 years in California are more than 99% (USGS, 2008b). In general, 
however, the seismic risks from the NMSZ are of low probability and 
high consequences (Olshansky, 1994). Still, Memphis faces threats from 
other disasters, such as floods, tornadoes, ice storms, chemical spills, 
fires, and severe storms. 
A study of organizations in Memphis/Shelby county, therefore, makes 
for an interesting case for several reasons. The rarity of major 
earthquakes (magnitude 7.0 or greater) in Memphis/Shelby county in 
recent time poses challenges for organizations in deciding to mitigate 
and prepare for disasters. The absence of major disasters makes 
organizations apathetic and reluctant to adopt mitigation and 
preparedness measures (Lindell & Perry, 2007). And although, a vast 
majority of disaster studies, especially on earthquakes, have been 
carried out on the west coast and, in particular, California (e.g., Argothy, 
2003; Celsi, Wolfinbarger, & Wald, 2005; Kiecolt & Nigg, 1982; May 
& Wood, 2003); very few studies have analyzed responses to disaster 
risks in Memphis (e.g., Edwards, 1993) and few in the NMSZ (e.g., 
Atwood & Major, 2000; Mushkatel & Nigg, 1987a, 1987b; Olshansky, 
1994). Finally, studies on organizational preparedness suggest that 
organizations in Memphis/Shelby county do little to prepare for disasters 
(e.g., Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997; Webb et al., 2000). 
The data gathering procedure occurred in two phases—Interview 
phase and survey phase, with procedures starting in fall 2005 and ending 
in spring 2007. Fifteen exploratory interviews were conducted with 15 
different organizations in Memphis/Shelby county in the spring and 
summer of 2006. This consisted of open-ended in-person and telephone 
interviews with the professional managers of the organizations, 
addressing attitudes toward hazard risk management and risk 
information, and organizational actions with respect to risk. The 
interviews took approximately 30-60 min each. To check for 
information accuracy, the typed interview transcripts were sent back to 
the interviewees for review. 
The survey phase was administered in fall 2006. With the help of 
the Memphis Regional Chambers of Commerce, the research team 
queried an online reference service, Reference USA using “number of 
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employees” as a key index variable. The population of organizations was 
then stratified by employee size to allow organizations of all sizes in the 
Memphis metropolitan area to be surveyed and represented in sufficient 
numbers. There were 11 categories, which ranged from one employee 
to more than 9,999 employees. These were recategorized into seven 
categories-(1-9, 10-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-249, 250-499, and ≥500). Of 
these, 100 organizations were sampled from the first 6 categories, with 
the entire population of 101 organizations from the seventh category also 
being sampled. In addition, 32 utility companies were added, resulting 
in 733 organizations. 
After mailing the first batch of surveys, the team followed-up with 
postcards followed by a final batch of surveys, with surveys addressed to 
owners and risk managers of the organizations. The most frequent 
respondents were the manager (N = 51), owner (N = 44), president (N 
= 37), and chief and executive officer (N = 34). Other respondents 
include vice presidents, executive directors, principals, and a religious 
leader. Out of the 733 organizations sampled, 227 organizations returned 
the survey, generating a 31% response rate. Ten organizations 
declined to participate in the study for various reasons (e.g., “business 
is not being fully operational” and “due to the private nature of our 
business”). 
The question of nonresponse bias always arises with any survey 
data (Groves, 2006; Singleton & Straits, 2005). The decision to 
respond to an organizational survey can be influenced by any number 
of random factors, including time constraints (Smith, 1997). 
Organizations that have adopted mitigation and preparedness activities 
could also have been more inclined to answer our surveys compared 
with those that have not. However, because of the absence of the 
information required for comparing response rates across the 
subgroups and the unavailability of similar estimates from other 
sources from which to compare (Groves, 2006); we are limited in 
executing any of the assessment methods recommended. 
Nonetheless, “valid results can be obtained from organizational 
surveys with lower response rates” (Smith, 1997, p. 367). Overall, 
we cannot discount the importance of assessing nonresponse bias; 
where possible, such assessments should be conducted (Groves, 2006; 
Smith, 1997). 
 
Data 
 
The data used in this study contain disaster information from a 
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stratified random sample of public, private, and nonprofit organizations 
involved in disaster risk issues and organizations that a major disaster 
may significantly affect. The target organizations included, but were not 
limited to, utility companies, schools, health facilities, chemical 
companies, pharmaceutical companies, financial institutions, religious 
institutions, transportation, and restaurants. 
The first part of the survey consisted of questions regarding risk issues 
in organizations, such as availability of risk managers, amount of 
resources devoted to disaster planning, level of disaster concern, use of 
disaster information, impacts of disasters, engagement in mitigation and 
preparedness activities, sources of disaster information, and obstacles to 
disaster planning. The second part dealt with demographic information 
about organizational representatives that answered the surveys, such as 
age, length of residence in Memphis/Shelby county, duration in present 
position within the organization, and educational level. 
This data set is unique in two ways. First, it contains rare information 
on reported organizational behaviors toward certain disaster 
preparedness and mitigation strategies. It is well known that gathering 
disaster information on organizations is difficult because some 
organizations are afraid of the potential consequences of divulging such 
information (Auf der Heide, 1989). Second, the data set also contains 
information on mitigation and preparedness measures for different types 
of hazards in an area subject to moderate seismic risk. There is a 
tendency for researchers investigating disaster preparedness in 
organizations to focus on specific hazards (Mileti, 1999). With its 
inclusion of a host of other hazards such as tornadoes and hurricanes, this 
data set also provides an opportunity to understand the extent to which 
Memphis/Shelby county organizations are prepared for disasters beyond 
earthquakes. 
 
Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable—engagement in disaster mitigation and 
preparedness activities— is measured by the total number of mitigation 
and preparedness activities organizations adopt (see Table 1). We relied on 
the question, “Has your organization engaged in any of these activities 
over the past year?” Respondents answered “yes” or “no” for each of the 
10 activities.2 To generate an index of organizational disaster mitigation, we 
summed the responses for each organization to generate the total number 
of mitigation and preparedness activities. This 10-item index has high 
reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = .88). 
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Independent Variables 
To capture sector differences, we generated three dummy variables 
for nonprofit, public, and private organizations. Although the 
determinants of organizational disaster mitigation and preparedness 
remain rather ambiguous, a few suggestions can be drawn from the 
scanty literature. In our exploratory Tobit3 regression model, we 
therefore control for organizational demographics such as organizational 
size, whether an organization is a single location or has multiple 
locations, and organizational service fields. (See the appendices for the 
distributions and descriptive statistics). 
Researchers found firm size (measured as, resources and number of 
employees) to be an important, consistent, and positive predictor of 
disaster preparedness (e.g., Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997; Drabek, 1991; 
Quarantelli, Lawrence, Tierney, & Johnson, 1979; Webb et al., 2000). 
We measure organizational size by the number of full-time employees 
based on seven employee size categories in our data. We expect larger 
organizations to adopt more mitigation and preparedness measures than 
smaller organizations. 
Adoption has also been influenced by ownership patterns, that is, 
whether an organization is single standing or part of a larger chain 
(e.g., Quarantelli, et al., 1979; Drabek, 1991; Sadiq, 2010). These 
studies found that single-location organizations are less likely to adopt 
hazard adjustments. Based on The Memphis Regional Chamber of 
Commerce categories, organizations identified their business statuses as 
being either a branch, headquarter, single location, or a subsidiary. We 
use a dummy variable coded “1” for single-location organizations and 
“0” for multiple-location organizations and expect the former to adopt 
fewer mitigation and preparedness measures than the latter. 
Research also suggests that the adoption of disaster mitigation and 
preparedness measures also varies by organizational service fields such 
as education, health, travel, restaurants, lodging, entertainment, finance, 
and insurance industries (e.g., Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997; Sadiq, 2010; 
Webb et al., 2000). We therefore control for the organizational service 
fields using interaction terms for nonprofits that operate in the health or 
education fields. 
Finally, based on the myriad studies done by Lindell and his 
colleagues, risk perception has also been found to positively influence 
the adoption of hazard adjustments. We therefore control for risk 
perception as suggested by the PADM (Lindell & Perry, 2011). Due to a 
lack of an explicit measure of risk perception in our survey, we rely on 
responses to the question, “Please indicate the extent to which the 
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following disaster impacts might adversely affect your organization?” 
Using a scale ranging from, “1” to indicate Minor Adverse Impact—
to“5” indicating major adverse impact, respondents rated the following 
13 disaster impacts: (i) damaged reputation, (ii) disruption in supplies or 
deliveries, (iii) inability to communicate with employees, (iv) 
inadequate number of employees, (v) loss of commercial goods, (vi) loss 
of customers, (vii) loss of data, (viii) loss of life, (ix) loss of life support 
(e.g., food and water), (x) loss relative to competitor’s loss, (xi) power 
outage, (xii) structural damage, and (xiii) transportation disruption. We 
generate a measure of risk perception (mean concern for disaster impact) 
by calculating the mean response across the 13 disaster impacts 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .81) (see Showalter, 1993; Sadiq, 2010). 
 
Findings 
 
Based on differences of means tests, our findings show that different 
organizational types engage in different numbers of disaster mitigation 
and preparedness activities. In addition, these findings are consistent 
with previous research in some respects, although contradictory in 
others. Table 2 presents the three differences of means tests. 
Model 1 compares the mean mitigation and preparedness activity for 
public and nonprofit organizations. The result shows that the mean 
mitigation and preparedness activity for public organizations (7.14) is 
higher than that of nonprofit organizations (6.36); however, the 
difference in means between the two groups is not significant. This 
result is also confirmed by our Tobit regression model (in Table 3), 
where we control for organizational size, concern for disaster impact, 
and whether the organization is a single or multiple-location 
organization. Though the direction of this finding is consistent with 
Fowler et al.’s (2007) and Light’s (2008) finding that public (government) 
employees have the highest level of preparedness perception, the lack of 
statistical significance does not support Hypothesis 1. 
Conversely, our findings support Hypothesis 2. With a mean 
difference of 2.45, Model 2 in Table 2 indicates that nonprofit 
organizations adopt more mitigation and preparedness activities (6.36) 
than private organizations (3.91) and this is statistically significant. The 
Tobit regression results (in Table 3) tell a consistent story. Holding all 
else constant, the nonprofit organizations in our sample are more likely to 
adopt more disasters mitigation and preparedness measures compared 
with private organizations. This result is statistically significant and in 
line with Fowler et al. (2007) and Light (2008), who found that 
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nonprofit employees had higher levels of preparedness perception than 
private sector employees. 
Model 3 (in Table 2) also shows that the mean mitigation and 
preparedness activity for public organizations (7.14) is higher than that 
of private organizations (3.91). The difference in means between these 
two groups is 3.23 and is also significant. This result, which is 
consistent with the Tobit result, is also in line with Fowler et al.’s 
(2007) and Light’s (2008) findings. 
The control variables also provide illuminating results. Our 
regression results (Table 3) show that as the number of employees 
increase, the adoption of organizational mitigation and preparedness 
measures also increases. This result is also significant at 1% and suggests 
that organizations with more employees adopt more mitigation and 
preparedness measures, compared with those with fewer employees. This 
result is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Dalhammer & D’Souza, 
1997; Drabek, 1991; Lindell & Perry, 2011; Quarantelli et al., 1979; 
Sadiq, 2010); as Dalhammer and D’Souza (1997) noted, organizations 
with a large number of employees are more likely to have the 
resources to adopt mitigation and preparedness measures 
Consistent with Drabek’s (1991), Quarantelli et al.’s (1979), and 
Sadiq’s (2010) findings, with a predicted value of 2.45 points higher, 
our results also show that multiple-location organizations adopt more 
disaster mitigation and preparedness measures than single-location 
organizations, all else constant. This result is also quite significant the 1% 
level. However, our measure of risk perception, measured by degree to 
which an organization is concerned about the impact of disasters, 
showed a positive but insignificant result. 
 
Recommendations and Conclusions 
 
Overall, our findings suggest that although nonprofit organizations 
may face more challenges in raising funds, including possible donor-
restrictions to their financial resources relative to private and public 
organizations, nonprofits are not resistant to adapting organizational 
disaster mitigation and preparedness activities. 
Our exploratory qualitative interviews also offered an interesting 
speculation that, health (hospitals) and education nonprofits may adopt 
more mitigation and prepared- ness measures because they are mandated 
to do so by law because they house vulnerable populations such as, the 
elderly, the invalid, babies and children. As Aeberhard (2008) observed, 
“Health is often the most critical issue during the initial emergency 
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period of a disaster …” (p. 17S). Hospitals are critical infrastructures that 
communities depend on for the provision of medical services in the 
aftermath of disasters. In ensuring that hospitals remain functional 
after disasters, communities may be able to respond more effectively 
and recover faster. Our results however, do not support this speculation; 
nonprofits in the health and education service fields in our sample are not 
driving the results (see Table 3). 
Nonetheless, this study is not without its limitations that highlight 
the need to advance research in this area. First, there is a preponderance 
of private organizations (N = 157) compared with public (N = 33) and 
nonprofit (N = 34) organizations in the sample. Although this is not 
unusual due to the high number of private organizations relative to 
public and nonprofit organizations in the United States (Fowler et al., 
2007), the small samples may threaten the validity of our findings. As a 
result, any attempt to apply the findings of this study should proceed with 
caution. 
Second, this study is based on reported behavior of organizational 
readiness for disasters as opposed to the actual actions of Memphis 
organizations. As a result, it is difficult to ascertain if the nonprofits that 
we depend on during disasters would remain functional. In addition, 
nonprofits’ capacity to remain functional may also be influenced by the 
type of mitigation and preparedness activities (e.g., investments in 
structural mitigation activities as opposed to mentioning a potential 
disaster in an organizational meeting). This too may also vary by 
organizational size and field. For instance, smaller nonprofits with few 
staff are less likely to own property in spite of property tax exemptions 
and are, therefore, more likely to lease compared with larger nonprofits 
such as, hospitals and retirement homes, which require major 
investments in real estate property (Cordes, Gantz, & Pollak, 2002). 
To be able to fully assess the sector’s preparedness level, more 
nuanced, nonprofit- centered, national data are needed, which would 
allow researchers to control for a variety of contextual factors (e.g., 
total revenues, more service fields, organizational age, and whether 
nonprofits own or lease facilities). We also recommend that researchers 
examine the effects of other relevant independent variables (e.g., past 
disaster experience, risk perception), on the extent to which nonprofit, 
private, and public organizations adopt different kinds of mitigation and 
preparedness activities. Relevant to such a study would be to apply and 
test the usefulness of the PADM in understanding the predictive power of 
such factors on the adoption of hazard adjustments at the organizational 
level of analysis. 
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Finally, this study summed up all 10 mitigation and preparedness 
activities together to generate a mitigation and preparedness index. 
This approach assumes and uses equal weighting of the activities. In an 
effort to understand why organizations adopt the various strategies, we 
suggest that future research assign different weights to the different 
activities. Such distinctions will help researchers to assess the extent to 
which nonprofits are prepared for disasters. 
Based on the preceding, it is evident that the nonprofit sector has 
historically played a significant role in the nation’s disaster response, 
exemplified by its ability to handle large-scale disasters (GAO, 2006, 
2008). In addition, both state and local governments have come to rely 
heavily on the sector for social services provision and other mass care 
needs in both disaster and nondisaster situations (Smith, 2006; Smith & 
Lipsky, 1993). Cognizant of these important collaborative, 
supplementary, and complementary roles (Young, 2006a), we conclude 
that it is imperative to develop a better and deeper understanding of the 
extent to which the nonprofit sector itself, is prepared for disasters. 
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Notes 
 
1. The PADM generally supports the hypothesis that resource-constrained 
organizations are less likely to adopt mitigation and preparedness 
activities. The model also suggests other adoption determinants that are 
not available in the data set we used for this analysis (e.g., hazard 
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experience). Although the PADM pertains to household and individual 
disaster mitigation and preparedness, it does suggest that organizational 
preparedness may be influenced by a number of factors that are not 
represented here (e.g., risk perception). 
2. Table 1 shows the proportion of organizations in each sector that 
adopted each of the 10 mitigation and preparedness activities. For 
example, 82.4% of the nonprofit organizations in our sample (28 of the 
34) reported that they “Attended disaster meetings/training courses 
outside your organization,” compared with 30.6% of the private 
corporations (48 out of 157), and 87.9% of the public agencies (29 out 
of 33). 
3. Because our dependent variable values are bound between 0 and 10, 
this indicates both left and right censorship suggesting that we cannot 
observe organizations that are below the lower bound of “0” (when 
organizations create a false sense of security), nor the upper bound of 
“10” (those organizations that are investing in more mitigation and 
preparedness measures than those covered in the survey; for example, 
organizations may have flood insurance, a measure that was not 
included in our survey). In such cases, Wooldridge (2003) suggests 
Tobit as the appropriate regression model of choice to obtain nonbiased 
and consistent estimates. Nonetheless, our results are consistent with 
OLS estimates and with Poisson—which is used for count variables 
(models not included in this article). 
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7. Provided information to customers/members of 50.0% 20.4% 60.6% 
the community on issues related to disasters. 
8. Assessed or evaluated vulnerability to disasters or 
 
70.6% 
 
45.9% 
 
78.8% 
 
Table 1. Organizational Adoption of Disaster Mitigation and Preparedness Activities, by Sector 
 
 
 
Activit
y 
Nonprofit 
(N = 34) 
Private 
(N = 157) 
Public 
(N = 33) 
1. Attended disaster meetings/training courses 
outside your organization. 
2. Mentioned a potential disaster in an organizational 
meeting. 
3. Held disaster-related workshops/trainings within 
your organization. 
4. Discussed in an organizational meeting short-term 
responses to disasters. 
5. Arranged site visits by consultants or experts to 
better prepare for disasters. 
6. Discussed in an organizational meeting long-term 
strategies for recovery from disasters. 
82.4% 30.6% 87.9% 
 
76.5% 59.9% 90.9% 
 
73.5% 32.5% 75.8% 
 
73.5% 55.4% 90.9% 
 
55.9% 34.4% 66.7% 
 
38.2% 22.9% 42.4% 
 
 
 
estimated potential losses from disasters. 
9. Engaged in non-structural mitigation measures 
(e.g., securing computers). 
10. Engaged in structural mitigation measures 
(e.g., strengthening parts of a building). 
 
 
64.7% 52.2% 60.6% 
 
32.4% 18.5% 39.4% 
 
These figures represent the proportion of organizations, within each sector, that adopted each of the 
identified mitigation and preparedness activity.
 
Table 2. Outputs from Three Differences of Means Models. 
 
 N Mean SE t-test p-value 
Model 1 
Public 
 
 
28 
 
 
7.14 
 
 
0.44 
  
Nonprofit 33 6.36 0.48   
Difference  0.78 0.66 1.18 0.2435 
Model 2 
Nonprofit 
 
33 
 
6.36 
 
0.48 
  
Private 145 3.91 0.26   
Difference 
Model 3 
Public 
 
 
 
28 
2.45 
 
7.14 
0.60 
 
0.44 
4.10*** 0.0001 
Private 145 3.91 0.26   
Difference  3.23 0.63 5.11*** 0.0000 
***Significant at 1% (two-tailed tests). 
  
Table 3. Output from the Tobit Regression Model. 
Expected adoption of disaster 
mitigation and preparedness measures 
Nonprofit organizations 2.25** 
(1.05) 
Public organizations 3.23*** 
(–2.14) 
Employee size 0.78*** 
(5.84) 
Single location –2.45*** 
(–4.32) 
Mean concern for disaster impact 0.46 
(1.48) 
Nonprofit × health –1.35 
(–1.01) 
Nonprofit × education 1.68 
(1.04) 
Private organizations (constant) 0.94 
(0.69) 
Observations 197 
Pseudo R2 0.098 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%. 
  
 Appendix A 
Distribution of Employee Size, by Sector. 
    
Employee size Nonprofit Private Public  Total % of total 
1-9 2 34 1  37 17.2 
10-19 0 21 1  22 10.2 
20-49 4 23 3  30 13.9 
50-99 1 22 9  32 14.9 
100-249 13 29 5  47 21.9 
250-499 5 21 7  33 15.4 
500 4 5 5  14 6.5 
Total 29 155 31  215 100 
 
Appendix B 
     
Descriptive Statistics.      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Disaster mitigation and preparedness measures index 206 4.74 3.27 0 10 
Public 224 .15 .36 0 1 
Private 224 .70 .46 0 1 
Nonprofit 224 .15 .36 0 1 
Employee size 215 3.86 1.87 1 7 
Single-location 218 .78 .42 0 1 
Mean concern for disaster impact 220 3.64 .76 1 5 
Health×nonprofits 224 .05 .23 0 1 
Education×nonprofits 224 .03 .16 0 1 
 
